Naconah. The Mumbai Option – Part II
Regarding the recent attack on the hospital in Yemen, we need to address the Mumbai issue and quickly. It is amazing how the first responder community still remains ignorant of the Mumbai lessons, not to mention police and National Guard. I trained elements from these agencies, however there is no national coordination or training efforts to address this issue. Momentarily, they are blowing hospitals and people up overseas while chopping our people here at home. I keep YELLING until I am blue in the face that Mumbai is coming here. Cliff, perhaps you can get some input from the local cops about this.
The Mumbai terrorists used machine guns, RPGs, satchel charges and grenades along with automatic rifles. Over a span of several days they executed a rather sophisticated military operation attacking several iconic targets. The targets included a community center, a train station, a hospital, and two well known hotels. Twenty-five operatives killed some 175 people and wounded over 300 persons. The outcome was chaos. Firemen and first responders were attacked. Indian police and military suffered from shock and awe syndrome and remained at first largely ineffective. Mumbai, India’s financial center suffered serious losses and tourism was badly affected.
One of the significant findings is that the attackers blended in well with the population, had planned the operation meticulously and were determined to carry it through. Additionally, they had conducted an intelligence assessment and reconnaissance and cached weapons and ammunition in the hotels. They did not use WMDs. There was no need as ordinary infantry weapons served admirably. They infiltrated the AO by sea and were in position without attracting attention when they initiated the attack. They attacked a police station, pinning down with heavy fires police units and disrupted police response and communications for a considerable amount of time.
Terrorist assault teams then attacked a hospital, a movie theater, a cafe, and community center and then focused attention on the Trident and Taj Mahal hotels. Security forces encountered heavy resistance, ambushes, interlocking fields of fire, and had to engage in room to room clearing operations. Explosive booby traps were rigged in some of the hotel rooms.
I. Outcomes and Significance of Mumbai
1. Terrorists used commonly found infantry weapons found in conflict zones.
2. Terrorists used explosives and booby traps
3. Terrorists attacked police and overwhelmed them, disrupting police communication nodes and police response. Police executives were killed in the attack
4. Terrorists preplanned the operation, infiltrated by sea and cached weapons and ammunition to sustain the assault phase.
5. Terrorists remained undercover without attracting notice or a police challenge
6. Terrorists attacked multiple targets and coordinated the attacks
7. The targets were public places: medical care facilities, transportation centers and hotels where large numbers of people are found… a target rich environment
8. The attack was carried out over a number of days
9. The attackers retained the initiative and evaded responding police
10. The attackers used barricades, seize and hold tactics, challenging police and military to a MOUT scenario to flush them out
11. The attackers opened fire on responders at every opportunity
12. The attackers used vehicles to conduct drive by shootings
13. The attackers used a variety of comms, including cell phones and GPS devices
14. The terrorists were mobile: foot and vehicles and shot at citizens at every opportunity
15. The attacks on iconic targets provide guaranteed high profile media coverage
II. Security Failures
1. There were no active shooter response procedures in place
2. There were no common frequency comms between responding units. Comms were best described as a cluster fuck.
3. No back up for police comms taken out in the attack on the police station
4. No overall centralized command authority took charge of the counter op, especially during its critical early phases
5. Police and security force response was piecemeal and insufficient
6. IEDs and explosives used by the attackers degraded security response and prolonged the op due to mine/bomb clearing requisites. Security failed to recognize that explosives and booby traps were elements in the strikes
7. First responders did not integrate a cohesive response plan or train together
8. Special operation military units took over 8 hours to arrive on the scene
9. IEDs that exploded at random caused additional surprise and confusion
10. Security forces failed to identify the number and location of the attackers and could not manage an overall coordinated response
11. Overall intelligence failure–no adequate warning that the attack was imminent
12. Security forces failed to execute appropriate containment perimeters allowing the attackers to displace
13. Responding fire units and equipment could not cope with large scale multiple fires
1. Terrorists are capable of conducting sophisticated STRATEGIC mass casualty assaults without the need for WMDs
2. The automatic rifle is a significant mass casualty weapon complimenting explosives
3. Intelligence is critical to disrupt, preempt or to forestall such an attack
4. Emergency responders are at risk and so are hospital personnel
5. Armed citizens and their willingness to intervene can prove critical in disrupting an attack
6. Emergency personnel must train together and have interoperable communications
7. All comms must have backups
8. Emergency personnel must account for command personnel casualties and must train subordinates to assume command
9. Emergency personnel must plan for multiple contingencies
10. Emergency personnel must be able to provide for their own recon and intel
11. Iconic structures and hospital and emergency personnel are at risk
12. Armed citizens or citizens at large are now first responders. They must be able to react on their own
Dialog: The Mumbai Option
From Bo on September 29 of 2014.
How did the terrorist communicate or did they? If by cell phone then we need to blow the tower power or something less drastic if there is an available plan for power shutdown. The value of this must be weighed carefully against victims call for aid and the terrorist need for communications. Jam the com freq if by radio. Schedule com time for responders and jam all other times. Map sniper positions where terrorists can fire from and plan position where those areas can be attacked by counter sniper details. from the terrorist position map determine safe areas and hot areas within target complex. This will allow you to narrow down the best positions for the terrorist and the best position to take them out.
Dense white smoke can be made from potassium chlorate and sugar until help arrives.
As intel starts to warm up keep track of the weather forecast. Attacks tend to happen on windy days to reduce the effect of smoke and gas.
Keep plugging ———-. It’s only a matter of time. The army is giving away MRAPs. ask for one as a village memorial and you’ll get one just keep it in running condition.
From Quintas Dias on September 29 of 2014.
Yeah, they did and a lot with their op center in Pakistan using sat and cell phones. I must say that the Indian army when they engaged did a good job, but it took them 8 hours to mobilize and get on the job. Police are not equipped to do house to house fighting. They can, but they don’t have the equipment for this. That is a tac section’s job. I do not object to police having MRAP’s, as long as they are not used against civilians for ordinary operations. Police are not military, break things kinda of guys. Collateral damage is not acceptable in police ops. Don’t object to having police armed with ARs…but I do OBJECT in having them shoot up the neighborhood and suspects in uncontrolled mad minutes. We have gone too far with brutal and unaccountable police and I know where that it is coming from. Whole bunch of chiefs need to be fired and go to jail. I do not want police thinking they are super soldiers and above citizens. Police have gotten into a fatal let’s wait for the SWAT team in dealing with critical incidents. They have to go back to being the Johnnies on the spot and acting accordingly.
Thanks for the observations. I’ll pass them on.
From Naconah to Group on September 29 of 2014.
Bo’s comments…timely and good ones.